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Enforcement of Environmental Measures: Negotiating the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement

This paper traces the negotiation of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement, conducted during the summer of 1993. It contrasts the original position of theNAFTAparties to the final agreement,and finds that the initial demand by the United States for an international mechanism (specifically, trade sanctions) to enforce the NAFTA parties' environmental legislation became heavily qualified in the final agreement. The reasons for this outcome were: (i) environmental enforcement posed a threat to national sovereignty; (ii) trade sanctions represented a special concern for smaller NAFTA part ners, and presented problems of workability in practice; and (iii) a cooperative rather than prosecutorial approach promised more positive benefits in an international environmental agreement. These conclusions are likely to pertain to future accession negotiations should NAFTA be expanded to include new members.

The Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 3, No. 1, 29-41 (1994)
DOI: 10.1177/107049659400300103


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